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What do you see? A phenomenological contribution to Mitchell’s picture theory: 
Fiedler, Husserl, Imdahl 
 
 
In der bildenden Kunst handelt es sich weder um Inhalt noch um Form, sondern um Bildmäßigkeit, um 
Phänomenalität. Robert Vischer, Der Ästhetische Akt und die reine Form (1874) 
 
On peut bien affirmer que tout est dicible, c’est vrai, mais ce qui ne l’est pas, c’est que la signification 
du discours recueille tout le sens du dicible. On peut dire que l’arbre est vert, mais on n’aura 
pas mis la couleur dans la phrase. Jean-François Lyotard, Discours, Figure (1971) 
 
Few models of image analysis have been so influential during the last decades as that 
provided by the pictorial turn. The current article is a contribution to this paradigm 
that is associated to the work of William John Thomas Mitchell. At least three books 
from his extensive bibliography are the pillars on which the picture theory stands. 
Simplifying to the extreme, Iconology (1986) marked a clear shift from the linguistic 
to the pictorial turn and focused on the specificity of images as a means of 
representation. Picture Theory (1994) drew a further link between pictures and 
cultural politics. What Do Pictures Want (2005) approached visual culture through a 
broad range of techniques and practices that justify visuality, from technical imagery 
to epistemological enquiries into vision based on anthropological and physiological 
positions.  
 
Nevertheless, one wonders why these studies that cover a wide horizon of 
methodological approaches - ranging from Panofsky’s iconology to Goodman’s 
theory of symbols - avoid the phenomenological theory of visuality and image-
consciousness. We refer here to at least three moments that are important for picture 
theory: the pre-phenomenological theory of Konrad Fiedler, Husserl’s 
phenomenology of image-consciousness and Imdahl’s iconics (posited as an 
alternative to Panofsky’s iconology). After all, if picture theory treats images as 
constitutive of our perception and interpretation of the world, how can it omit these 
fundamental insights into the specificity of visuality? Is it a case of a primal 
repression or simply of a different take on the conception of images? In What Do 
Pictures Want? especially, Mitchell insists that the object of visual studies is not just 
art history and aesthetics but a long list of all imaginable approaches to visuality, 
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ranging from technical imagery to philosophical and psychoanalytic investigations 
into the nature of vision, sociological and even phenomenological studies. (Mitchell 
2005, 339) It seems that the shift from the linguistic to the pictorial left us with fewer 
than with more distinctions. Any paradigm that relates to visuality and imagery is 
assimilated as significant because visual culture does not only deal with images but 
also with quotidian and immediate ways of seeing. (Mitchell 2005, 343) Images are 
complex socio-cultural constructs that demand a literacy and a correlation to other 
senses and modes of interpretation.  
 
Nevertheless, the homologation of visuality and imagery to other means of mediating 
meaning (like texts, charts, practices) entails the risk of ignoring a difference, namely 
that visuality and imagery refer to distinctive types of intuitions that correspond to 
different types of consciousness. On the other hand, the contribution of 
phenomenology to picture theory delineates a structural difference in these types of 
consciousness: intuiting a visual image is not the same as intuiting an equally visual 
object given in the flesh. One thus wonders whether Mitchell is right to argue that 
visual culture begins with the perception of the face of the other. (Mitchell 2005, 351) 
From a phenomenological perspective, perceiving a face present in the flesh differs 
from the perception of an image of that face. The referent is readable as identical but 
the type of consciousness pertaining to the two acts of perception is different. One 
could argue that visual culture begins with the awareness of a distinction in 
perceiving an image from the presence of its correlate.  
 
Further, as Imdahl’s iconic method will show, images constitute the objects it refers to 
by subordinating them to its own visual structure. As we shall see, this visual 
structure is not an object in the world but an immaterial appearance. In this sense, 
Mitchell reminds us that ‘vision is itself invisible; that we cannot see what seeing is.’ 
(Mitchell 2005, 337) However, this is not a paradox but a tension between modes of 
consciousness that operate differently when perceiving a hologram, an object present 
in the flesh, a phantasm or when reading a poem. Images are constructs that reach us 
differently from other objects and especially from the presence of a person.1 Yet the 
picture theory turns a blind eye to the fact that the visual culture involves distinct 
modulations of consciousness. One can turn images into agencies that act on us, 
endow them with vitality and desire in order to ask what do they really want. 
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(Mitchell 2005, 11, 90) While projecting intentionality onto artefacts, this 
extrapolation forgets to describe the way in which consciousness intuits them as 
artefacts. Mitchell argues that ‘what pictures want from us, what we have failed to 
give them, is an idea of visuality adequate to their ontology’. (Mitchell 2005, 47) 
Also, in Iconology, he rightly pointed out the necessity of accounting for the 
‘uniqueness of the graphic image’. (Mitchell 1986, 156)  
 
However, this ‘uniqueness’ and this ‘ontology’ require a proper phenomenological 
description that distinguishes the intuition of the visual before relating it to other 
forms of representation.2 A phenomenological description is required precisely in 
order to distinguish the forms of representation that images introduce within the 
visual culture. This is thus opposed to the mere homologation of images to other form 
of representation. Simply put, a phenomenology of images and their appertaining type 
of consciousness can precisely delineate how images visually mediate our perception 
of the world.  Without making any ontological claims, the following sections provide 
the picture theory with a necessary phenomenological appendix that includes three 
episodes: Konrad Fiedler’s theory of pure visuality, Husserl’s description of the 
image consciousness and Max Imdahl’s iconic method. These three episodes mark an 
evolution in the phenomenological model of image analysis. As it shall be shown, this 
model emphasises the potentiality of visuality as a means thorough which images 
provide the presentation of the world with a visual sense.  
 
I. Pre-phenomenological method: Konrad Fiedler 
An image says a thousand words: this adage sums up one part of the Western 
philosophy of art. Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder would crystallize another part. 
A third phrase would have to render the production of art. Regarding the perception 
and interpretation of images, a methodological distinction is required because, on the 
one hand, the bulk of the philosophical tradition approached images as analogical to 
other communicative processes. On the other hand, the phenomenological method 
focuses on the visual object that images reveal while distinguishing this object from 
its referent and describing its corresponding type of consciousness. Identifying a 
referent in an image or designating the lack thereof homologates the image to other 
systems of signs. Emphasising our relation to images is a necessity (Mitchell 2005, 
49), yet this relation subordinates visuality to other means of communication. This 
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approach overlooks the specificity of the visual because it methodologically integrates 
it within a general economy of signs. That is, we look at images in order to identify, 
communicate or debate a subject.  
 
This is the case even in theories that reject mimesis as a sufficient and necessary 
condition to explain how images make sense. Nelson Goodman’s classic Languages 
of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (1968, 1976) explained images by means 
of a general theory of symbols. So denotation is understood not as a specific function 
of images but as a generic mode of signification. Even though images are dense and 
undifferentiated symbols, for Goodman, they signify by conforming to a system of 
conventions. They are different from language yet they still abide to the coding 
function specific to all systems of signs.3 The image is a visual sign (dense and 
irregular) whose actual meaning depends on knowledge of the codes it actualises. 
 
The code that mediates the meaning of images can be broad. In The Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace (1981), Arthur Danto famously argued that an art historical style 
is a way of seeing that can be learned. Giotto’s contemporaries spontaneously grasped 
the meaning of his works as windows to the presented holy scenes. If Giotto’s way of 
seeing appears opaque to us, it is because we are not accustomed to it the way the 
‘artworld of his time’ was. (Danto 1981, 163) The clarity of the argumentation reveals 
also its simplicity and its apparent common-sense. In Danto’s view, the visuality that 
an artist produces requires the acceptance and the mediation of the artworld. The 
specialised public mediates the visuality of the artist and transforms it into a code that 
anyone can appropriate. Regardless of the problematic stance towards the pre-
existence of a spectatorship for the artist’s work, the epistemological claim is clear: 
images actualise the deep level structure of a shareable code.4 Because they depend 
on a code that they actualise, the visuality of images is subordinated to their 
communicative performativity. And for the picture theory this performativity is 
relational because images are interpreted as in a constant interaction to the social 
context that they mediate.5 However, this approach undervalues the optical force of 
images that is perceived as the mediator of information. What you see is what you the 
code allows you to see because the act of seeing is essentially an act of translation.  
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Now, the picture theory has had a subtle relation to this communicational function of 
images. Mitchell has time and again emphasised the visual value (or here is 
designated by ‘optical force) of images. Recently, in What Do Pictures Want?, he 
argued that ‘what pictures want is not the same as the message they communicate or 
the effect that they produce; it’s not even the same as what they say they want. Like 
people, pictures may not know what they want; they have to be helped to recollect it 
through a dialogue with others.’ (Mitchell 2005, 46) However, in order to underline 
this visual value one has to approach it through means that do not homologate it to 
other means of communication. Dialoguing about what images connote does not 
necessarily identify their potential as images.  
 
In this context, Konrad Fiedler intimated in the middle of the 19th century an insight 
into the optical force of images that he extracted and explored as the pertinent 
criterion for a pre-phenomenological approach of images.6 Fiedler’s art theory merely 
anticipated the phenomenological method and questioned the communicative function 
of images. Images are conceived as creative acts that mediate, like science, an 
understanding of the world. In the language of Goodman, their function is to 
constitute the world and just not to mirror it. Yet in order to describe this function, 
images are approached according to a different method. If the iconographic content of 
images is bracketed, then the correlate of the intuition is a visual appearance. What 
you see when you suspend the content of an image is not the visibility of something 
but an autonomous visual entity that Fiedler called ‘pure visuality’ (reine 
Sichtbarkeit). This might seem an artificial way of perceiving an image because any 
viewer tries to identify an object in an image. Nevertheless, this identification has to 
be postponed in order to determine the specific way in which an image appears to the 
mind.  
 
Lambert Wiesing has further expounded the notion of ‘pure visuality’ by 
distinguishing it from the notion of ‘adherent visuality’ (anhängende Sichtbarkeit).7 
On the one hand, ‘adherent visuality’ designates the fact that the visual is one 
amongst different attributes of an object that can be perceived through senses other 
than sight (like smelling or touching). On the other hand, the notion of ‘pure visuality’ 
abstracts the visual appearance of an object and transposes the other senses 
(especially touch) within the realm of the visible. Hence, in order to describe the 
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specificity of the visual realm one has to bracket the materiality and the content of an 
image. This act of bracketing might seem an abstraction from the perspective of the 
picture theory, yet it is here required as a methodological step. Because it considers 
the visual as always embedded in other systems of signs, the picture theory resists the 
idea of a visuality that is pure. (Mitchell 2008, 13) However, this purity neither 
excludes the relation of vision to other senses nor does it reject a visual literacy. 
Fiedler proposes a methodological shift that purifies the visual form in order to 
determine the specificity of the visual as a form of signification distinct and not 
adjacent to language.  Emulating visuality to the ‘ability to read’ undermines – at least 
on a methodological level - the optical force that images have. The idea is not to 
extrapolate the functioning of other systems of signs into the realm of the visual in 
order to show how images signify. To the contrary, even when relating images to the 
entire ‘panoply of figures’ and discourses, the goal is to distinguish the functioning of 
images from other systems of signs. These other figures are significant for a picture 
theory as long as they resist – as a figural force, optical and plastic – their 
subordination to other system of signs. Or, if reading means following the regularity 
of a determinate code, the idea of ‘reading’ images is detrimental to their ontology 
and, as we shall see, to their phenomenological appeal.  
 
The phenomenological approach to images starts thus with a difference between the 
perception of objects present in the flesh, the interpretation of signs and the 
perception of images. While visibility is one amongst other senses through which we 
perceive objects (adjacent to touching or smelling), visuality refers to an appearance 
that images display. What they show is an optical construct different from the 
material through which they appear and that exists for the eye alone. I see and touch a 
tree in a garden but the photograph or the painting of the same tree appears as an 
ensemble of lines and shades. This ensemble can be used as a sign for the tree yet, as 
a visual appearance, this communicative is secondary to the fact that it constitutes 
that tree as an optical manifestation.8 Simply put, no one needs an image, let alone a 
history of art, in order to learn how trees look.  Images present us with a visuality that 
is distinct from the quotidian visibility. In this sense, visual culture starts with the 
bracketing of visibility and the cultivation of visuality. In other words, visual culture 
begins when images are no longer treated according to the economy of signs but as 
visual appearances that resist their subordination to the system of signs.  
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Only in a second step this pure visuality gives a visual sense to the world that it 
signifies. If one looks through the colours and shades of a painting, then these 
chromatic elements have a strong impact onto the way that the viewer perceives the 
world. The painting is not just a sign of the world but it also mediates our visual 
perception of the world. In this sense, the visual culture ‘invents’ the landscape 
because we look at Dutch 19th century landscape painting in order to see its colours 
and not in order to treat the painting as a sign for the actual landscape. The position of 
formalism towards visual culture is founded on the bracketing of the communicative 
function of images. One has to describe how artistic images determine our perception 
of nature and not how images help us communicate about nature.  
 
In Über die Beurteilung von Werken der Bildenden Kunst (1876), Fiedler rejects the 
conception of art as an imitation of nature. The image does not render an object 
(which is itself not a fixed entity) but it actually presents visual traces that are not in 
the referent. Lines, chromatic tones and perspectival arrangements constitute an 
optical appearance that is not necessarily part of the presented object. Fiedler explains 
the creative act as a modalisation of being, i.e. the image is a process of that 
constantly transforms a referent. He writes: ‘The artist is called upon to create another 
world besides and above the real one, a world free from early conditions, a world in 
keeping with his own discretion. This realm of art opposes the realm of nature.’ (in 
Karl Ashenbrenner, ed., 1965, 364). Images shape visibility (Sichtbarkeitgestaltung) 
and this is a process equally significant for what it leaves our as for what it presents. 
However, this optical structure - other than the material of the image and its content - 
is ‘figural’ (in the sense of Lyotard) because it both reveals and hides aspects of the 
presented object. The optical structure that the image presents has an optical force 
because it determines the way that the viewer perceives the object as a visual sign.  
 
Fiedler intimated thus the development of the visual arts in modernity when he argued 
in Über den Ursprung der künstlerischen Tätigkeit (1887) that the development of the 
visual arts makes impossible any comparison between art and nature. Like Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, Fiedler conceives language and visual arts as constitutive of thinking: 
they both mediate our knowledge of the world.9 Other than science that subordinates 
the world to concepts, visual arts mediate this world as a visual construction. 
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However, Fiedler also relates images and language but then from a different 
perspective than as means of communication. Both language and art are expressive 
movements (Ausdruckbewegung) that constitute the perceived reality. Fiedler uses the 
metaphor of a flower: the plant grows into a fruit that, like the artwork, is different 
from the plant itself.10  
 
The autonomy of form is taken to the extreme as Fiedler repeats this line of thought in 
his reflections on architecture. In the Bemerkungen über Wesen und Geschichte der 
Baukunst (1878), Fiedler argues that architecture liberates form both from the 
material and from the practical constraints. Schopenhauer already argued for the 
primacy of form over matter in architecture, yet bracketing the purpose of a building 
is a controversial argument. Architecture becomes with Fiedler an exercise in the 
austerity of imagination that generates tectonic forms without symbolic or practical 
use. 11 This extrapolation of visuality in Fiedler’s absolute formalism already 
announces the phenomenological model of the image. The image thematises what 
Rober Vischer called around the same time in the 19th century the ‘phenomenality’ of 
the world, a visual appearance that is distinct from the denoted referent.  
 
II. The phenomenological method:  Edmund Husserl 
While Fiedler distinguished pure visuality as the pertinent object of image analysis, 
Husserl provided a precise description of its corresponding type of consciousness.12 In 
distinction from the picture theory, the phenomenological method begins with a 
differentiation. On the one hand, the perception of an object presents (gegenwärtigen) 
a correlate that exists here and now (the table on which my arm rests). On the other 
hand, the object of a phantasy or memory is not here in the flesh but it is thought of as 
happening now (I can imagine a unicorn). Hence, other than the perception of a 
present object, a phantasy or an image presentify their objects (or renders them 
present, as the notion vergegenwärtigen is sometimes translated).  
 
Nevertheless, the differences between these modalities of presentation are more 
significant than their similarities. Firstly, the phantasy lacks the character of reality 
because, when I intend centaurs, the correlate appears in a ‘quasi’ mode: it is as if it 
was present but it is not present like the table on which I write. The imagining 
consciousness also posits its correlate as absent: when I imagine a tree that I once 
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saw, I present something that is now absent. In phantasy, an image hovers before me 
while I am free to change its consistency and content. (Husserl 1980, 13) These 
distinctions are significant in order to understand that the image consciousness lies 
between perception and imagining. A picture shows a correlate that is not present 
(gegenwärtig) but rendered present or presentified (appearing as a 
Vergegenwärtigung). The intuition of a photograph of a tree is open to different 
objects: there is the material carrier (the photographic paper) and the immaterial 
semblance (the form and the colour of the displayed tree).  
 
Now, this distinction is evoked in the picture theory, yet without any reference to 
Husserl’s phenomenology. (Mitchell 2005, 85; Mitchell 2008, 16) More importantly, 
Mitchell focuses on the distinction between the carrier and the appearance but 
overlooks the modality of the consciousness pertaining to images. This is important 
because, as we shall see, the structure of the image consciousness explains the picture 
theory’s communicational approach to images. For the moment, it is important to be 
aware that the phenomenological method dematerialises the image in order to 
designate the double correlate of its intuition: we perceive a picture (a material 
inscription) and an image (an immaterial appearance of shapes and colours, an optical 
appearance).13 Hence, Husserl distinguishes between three constitutive components of 
an image: the material carrier, the image-object (Bildobjekt) and the image-subject 
(Bildsujet). The carrier is the paper or the canvass on which the image is materially 
inscribed. The image-object is the immaterial semblance that has a form or a 
chromatic appearance. The image-subject is the reference that the image-object 
designates.  
 
What do you see when looking at an image from Husserl’s perspective? Given a 
photograph of a tree, one does not apprehend either the tree (that is absent) or the 
medium (the photographic paper). What you see is an image-object or a semblance 
that does not exist like the real tree or the paper on which it is inscribed.14 Properly 
speaking, an image is not a thing; literally speaking, an image is no-thing, an 
apparition or a semblance. The phantasy of a palace in Berlin is different from its 
photographic presentation. Other than an object present in the flesh or the phantasy of 
the same object, the image-object is an immaterial nothing (ein Nichts), a not-now in 
the now or a nullity exhibiting something absent. (Husserl 1980, 45) 
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Imagination allows the perceiver to see into the image a different temporal and spatial 
layer than what is actually present. Take as an example Roland Barthes’ photograph 
of his mother: the picture renders present in the now a non-existent moment and a 
non-existent subject. The moment and the subject do not exist like the material picture 
that Barthes holds in his hands. The image-object has no material presence and 
merely renders something present that does not belong to this instant (of looking at 
the image). The imaginative apprehension aims at a different subject that resembles 
the person that existed in the flesh. The image only awakens the mental image that 
corresponds to it. (Husserl 1980, 22) In other words, the image-object is not a 
substance present in a place but an appearance that initiates a relation to something 
absent. The visual semblance (the image-object) prompts a relation to the mother (the 
image-subject).  
 
If the presentation of an image is figurative, one can identify an image-subject into the 
image-object (like the banal recognition of a palace in a photograph). However, this 
does not exclude the possibility of associating this image-subject to other, latently 
present, subjects like social status or architectural styles. These are not the actual 
image-subjects but potential relations that the structure of the image allows. It is thus 
the dissociation of the image’s constitutive layers and its dematerialisation indicates 
an internal relational structure that allows the viewer to correlate the image-object to 
different image-subjects. In this sense, this phenomenological description justifies the 
claim that ‘what pictures want from us … is an idea of visuality adequate to their 
ontology’. (Mitchell 2005, 47) In other words, phenomenology provides the ontology 
of the image that the picture theory anticipates. However, this ‘ontology’ depends on 
the image-consciousness that entails a relational structure and points to its subject(s). 
The communicational bias of the picture theory fundamentally depends on the internal 
relational structure of the image consciousness. The image is a conflictual space 
because it is perceived as more than its medium and other than its subject.15 If this 
conflict between physical medium and image-object vanishes, then the image-
consciousness stops. The political power of images that the picture theory and the 
cultural studies cherish so much depends on an internal dissociation that 
consciousness can cultivate by associating the image-object to other subjects.  
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When fantasising, the image is identical to its content and both can change: in 
ordinary circumstances, the object of daydreaming and its alterations alter according 
to one’s will. When viewing a picture, one intuits either the material carrier or the 
image-object. A Raphael painting can be perceived as a pierce of canvass or as an 
image-object in which a woman coloured in black and surrounded by cherubs is 
identified. However, the two correlates cannot be simultaneously intuited. (Husserl 
1980, 44) Simply put, the viewer is either in the position of the restorer who intends 
the paint and the canvass or in the position of the art historian who intends the formal 
and symbolic values.16 In section 16, Husserl argues that reproductions of paintings 
cannot be the subject of an aesthetic experience. They are merely indexes of the 
originals or ‘repertories of memory’. Should we then put into perspective this 
phenomenological dematerialisation of images? If the aesthetic experience depends 
on the presence of the original, then it must also consider the material qualities. When 
it comes to the aesthetic experience of paintings, the idea of an immaterial image-
object is a considerable tension.  
 
Sartre too, emphasised this relation character of the image consciousness by arguing 
that it is an illusion to think that images are immanent to consciousness, as if they 
were dwelling in a place. To the contrary, the image is a relation through which 
consciousness renders present something absent. (Sartre 1940, 49) In perceiving an 
object that is present, one synthesises the multiple adumbrations (or shadings) of the 
present object. (Sartre 1940, 22) The object of an image is not a thing but a relation to 
something that is ‘quasi-observed’ and already known. In the language of 
L’imagination (1936), the image I have of a friend is a form of consciousness through 
which I relate to him or her. The object of an aesthetic experience (from this 
phenomenological perspective) is not the painting of Charles VIII as an entity made 
of wood and canvass and hanging in the Uffizi but an image appearing to the imaging 
consciousness, a synthetic whole perceived through the canvas. (Sartre 1940, 362) 
The image is a conflictual space because it is perceived as more than its medium and 
other than its subject. For Sartre, this internal differentiation that splits the image into 
an immaterial appearance and a subject proves the relational power of consciousness 
and its awareness of its freedom. The unreality of the image-subject proves that 
consciousness is able to take distance from the real.  
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The politics of images depends on the potentiality of consciousness to extend beyond 
what a code determines as ‘readable’. The phenomenological method proves that the 
value of images rests in their ability to actualise a consciousness that is distinct from 
reading a text or perceiving a present object. The fact that in the image consciousness 
we take distance from the real proves that visuality generates its own type of thinking 
where images modulate our perception of the real. The fact that consciousness is free 
to associate the appearance and the subject of an image implies that the power of the 
visual is not bound to a code that can be read. To the contrary, the perception of 
images points to a type of thinking that is specific to visuality. Images do not just 
emulate other systems of signs but transforms our perception of the world.17 Within 
the field of art history, Max Imdahl’s iconic method reveals the ability of images to 
generate a visual level that actively intervenes into the interpretation of the texts that 
they refer to.  
 
III. The iconic method: Imdahl  
Fiedler anticipated the phenomenological model of image analysis by delineating pure 
visuality as the pertinent dimension of images. As Max Imdahl explains, Fiedler’s 
formalism emerged in an artistic environment that concentrated on the 
‘deconceptualisation of the world’ (Entbegrifflichung der Welt, Imdahl 1981, 13). As 
Jonathan Crary showed, the 19th century turned away from the disembodied model of 
vision based on the perspective that mapped out the geometrical space.18 Visuality is 
embodied and the senses are individually studied as in the experimental aesthetics of 
Wundt and Fechner. Also, John Ruskin argued that painting presents the world as an 
optical arrangement of colours and Jules Laforgue insisted that painting was an 
optical medium where the impressionistic renderings of nature appear as ‘coloured 
vibrations’ for an undifferentiating eye.19 While for Eduart Hanslick the object of 
music is the ‘tonally moving forms’ (tönend bewegte Formen), painting is for Fiedler 
a ‘visually forming activity’ (sichtbares gestaltende Tätigkeit, Imdahl 1981, 13).  
 
Imdahl’s Ikonic is a model of image analysis that integrated a phenomenological 
method in the art historical research. 20  In Giotto, Arenafresken: Ikonografie, 
Ikonologie, Ikonic (1981), Imdahl formulated his project of the iconic method as an 
alternative to Panofsky’s iconology. Panofsky explored the analogies between images 
and their external sources and in this sense iconology is a symptomatology.21 While 
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interpreting Giotto’s frescos from the Scrovegni chapel, the iconologist relates these 
images to the texts of Pseudo-Bonaventura and emphasises the anthropocentric 
experience of religious emotionality. Yet the interpretation of the image as a 
paraphrase of a text homologates the visual to ‘immanent meaning’ of the theological 
content. Giotto’s Ascent to Calvary would point out the presence of the religious 
affect in the sorrowful gaze of Mary and Jesus. What you see is what you can read but 
this does reveal the purely visual level through which the image modulates the 
theological texts.  
 
On the other hand, the iconic method detects within the image a level that is 
immanent to its autonomous visual structure and that modulates the textual reference. 
This visual structure develops between the visual rhythm of the image and the 
Biblical theme. The question is the ‘identity of visuality as a quality of expression that 
is not substitutable by anything else.’22 (Imdahl, 1980, 13, my translation) Different 
images may refer to the same Biblical text. Considered from the perspective of their 
‘visuality’ (Bildlichkeit), they refer intertextually to one another: the Resurrection of 
Lazarus from Padua is the model for the work in the Magdalena Chapel in Assisi. 
Their visual configurations point to one another yet, as images, they present us with a 
structure consisting of the relation between fore- and background, the distribution of 
colours and the choreography of the presented characters.  
 
In this context, Imdahl distinguishes between three dimensions of the image: first, the 
textual reference (Textreferenz) refers to the Biblical texts that the scene depicts; 
second, the objective reference (Gegenstandsreferenz) refers to the correlates that are 
identifiable in the scene; third, the visuality (Bildlichkeit) refers to the attributes that 
constitute the image as such.23 A pertinent image analysis has to reveal how the 
visuality mediates, within the space of the image, both the objective and the textual 
reference. (Imdahl 1980, 52) As long as the criteria that justify the image as a mode of 
signification constitute the object of inquiry, a theory of images has to reveal how 
these criteria modulate the objective and the textual references that the image 
designates. Merely identifying the objective references and subordinating them to the 
textual references turns the image into a symptom and its visuality in an adjacent 
mode of signification.  
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However, as we shall see, this is not the case. According to Imdahl, the image 
corresponds to two forms of seeing that coincide in the case of Giotto: a ‘recognising 
seeing’ (das wiedererkennende Sehen) and a ‘visualising seeing’ (das sehende Sehen). 
These two forms of seeing recuperate the phenomenological distinction between two 
types of consciousness. The ‘recognising seeing’ intends the textual referents that are 
external to the image, namely the Biblical texts. On the one hand, the image-object 
coincides here with the image-subject and the image is treated as a text that can read, 
i.e., it can be decoded if the viewer acknowledges its underlying code. The popular 
visual studies of the last decades treat the image in such a way and this method can 
indeed be called a ‘calculated representation’. (Alloa 2005, 670) Precisely that which 
resists the binary logic of discourse - the density, the plasticity and the visuality of 
images - is subordinated to the logic of communicability. What you see is what an 
invisible code can transmit. On the other hand, the ‘visualising seeing’ intends the 
visual structure of the image itself. This requires two steps: firstly, one has to 
provisionally postpone all interests in the objective and textual references of the 
image. If the latter are bracketed, then the image presents us with the perspective and 
the scenic choreography, the arrangement and the gestures of the characters. The 
elements constitute the composition of the plane and belong to the visuality of the 
image. If the iconographic elements are abstracted, the result is the planar 
composition, a set of relations between directions, lines, colours and masses. 
Secondly, the question is how does this visualising type of seeing modulate the 
textual elements, namely the Biblical texts?  
 
Take Giotto’s The Presentation of Jesus in the Temple (Fig. 1). From the perspective 
of the recognising type of seeing, the viewer identifies a ciborium in the middle of the 
image. However, the ciborium is more than a figure that corresponds to an 
architectural object. From the perspective of the visualising type of seeing, the 
ciborium unites the figures as a group, namely Mary, Jesus and Simeon. Also, the 
form of the ciborium produces the perspectivist space and introduces density within 
the image. It provides the image with volume and it opens up the space while 
highlighting the central figure. Hence, the ciborium is a device that generates a 
specific visual meaning. As such, it is independent from the textual reference on 
which the image is based. If the ciborium were disregarded, the entire composition 
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would be a flat relief. The hypothesis is that images include elements that modulate 
the textual reference and that it is this modulation that justifies the visual presentation. 
One has to learn how to identify those elements within an image that actively resist 
the subordination of the image to the text. Leaning how to ‘read’ an image actually 
means ceasing to treat the image as a text. Other elements validate this hypothesis: 
first, the arches of the ciborium are optically related to the figures. The front left arch 
isolates Mary; the right one isolates Simeon and Jesus. (Imdahl 1980, 46) The double 
orientation of Jesus to Simeon and Mary also crystallises the temporality of the 
image: the posture of Jesus towards Simeon instantiates a synchronicity of ‘still-and-
no-longer’ (noch und nucht-mehr) and the movement towards Mary a synchronicity 
of ‘already-and-not-yet’ (schön und noch-nicht).  
 
This double temporality of ‘no longer’ and ‘not yet’ is a visual concentration of time 
(Zeitverdichtung) that the written Biblical texts do not accomplish.24 Hence, the 
visuality of the image surpasses the textual and the objective references, the 
paraphrase of the Biblical text and the creation of a semblance. Their spatial 
disposition presents a ‘scenic unity of meaning’ (szenische Sinneinheit) that works 
through the textual reference. In the words of Lyotard, it is a ‘figural’ force that 
modulates the discourse and not just a figurative rendering that emulates the Biblical 
text. And indeed, this optical force is essentially disparate and resists a stable code: 
the place of the angel can suggest the inspiration of Simeon but it can also intensify 
the gesture of returning the child to the mother, an aspect that sets aside the 
inspiration of Simeon. Hence, the depiction of the angel is more than an iconographic 
element that can be read and that corresponds to the Biblical text. The angel saturates 
the image with a distinct visual sense that constitutes the image as such: it connects 
the gesture towards Mary, a gesture that also crystalizes the inspiration of Simeon by 
the angel. (Imdahl 1980, 56)  
 
Hence, the iconic method (Ikonik) identifies a level of the image that surpasses both 
the visualising and the recognising seeing. It synthesises the practical experience of 
seeing into a totality of visual meaning. Following this method, the unity of a 
composition like The Kiss of Judas (Fig. 2) becomes manifest in a visual signifier that 
independent of the recognising type of seeing. The fresco presents a group of figures 
yet also includes a slant that appears if the viewer follows the direction of the club on 
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the left side of the image, further follows the heads of Jesus and Judas and ends in the 
pointing gesture of the Pharisee on the right. This slant that extends itself across the 
image relates the different figures to each other and marks the group as a whole. It can 
only be seen if the gaze follows this course. However, this slant is neither an objective 
nor a textual referent and it has no moment inscribed in the temporality of the story. 
The slant is neither an object, nor an event described in the Biblical text. It is visible 
but it is not a thing and it happens nowhere. In the language of Husserl, the slant 
belongs to the image-object and it provides the image with a visual meaning that is 
irreducible to the Biblical event. Its significance is independent of similarity or make-
belief and belongs to the potentiality of the optical force that gives scenic meaning to 
the picture.  
 
The slant modulates the Biblical texts because it brings together, through autonomous 
visual means, the supremacy of Jesus on the background of his passivity and, vice 
versa, his subordination on the horizon of his supremacy. (Imdahl 1980, 94-95) In 
order to comprehend the immense value of this phenomenological approach, imagine 
a different pictorial composition. If the pointing gesture of the Pharisee had not 
connected the group to the club, then the entire composition would have collapsed. 
Hence, the slant unites two layers of significance: the passivity of Jesus in the arms of 
Judas and the Pharisee pointing to him as to the one that the soldiers actively look for. 
The gesture increases the intensity of the movement from right to left, just as the same 
diagonal increases the intensity of the gaze between Jesus and Judas.  
 
The image as a visual construct includes a dimension that escapes the emulation of 
the visual to the textual. As the correlate of a ‘visualising seeing’, the image actualises 
what semioticians call an ‘aspectualisation’, i.e., a singular temporal and spatial 
distribution of figures in the synchronicity of the plastic surface. Meaning in visuality 
emerges as the outcome of spatial and temporal arrangements that constitute an 
image-object, an immaterial appearance that is something more than the material, the 
objective or the textual referent. The value of an artistic image consists in the ability 
to generate a visual structure that implements an optical force onto an event that can 
also narrated. Giotto’s frescos confront us with a level of visual immediacy that forces 
the ‘reading’ mind to follow the ‘seeing’ eye. What you see is the subordination of the 
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Biblical text to tensions and velocities of forms that modulate and not just emulate the 
holy story.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
From the perspective of the picture theory, the premises of the phenomenological 
approach can become the object of a harsh criticism. Does not the initial bracketing of 
the iconographic content transform the image into an empty abstraction? Does not this 
derealisation of the image diminish the critical impact that the visual arts can exercise 
on the social and cultural medium from which they emerge? Does not the 
dematerialisation of the image overlook the significance of the medium? It seems that 
the phenomenological approach fails to do justice to the material, technological and 
conceptual aspects of certain artistic styles. Take, for instance, the generative art 
where different technological systems determine the image as much as the intuition of 
the artist. Or even the matter-oriented art of arte povera where the relation of the 
visual to the material is too determinative for the latter to be bracketed. In this sense, 
it can be said that the picture theory surpasses the phenomenological because, instead 
of relying on distinctions between types of consciousness and visuality, it links the 
visual to other forms of signification.  
 
And yet, while it lacks a systematic stance towards the phenomenological approach, 
the picture theory indirectly imported some of its fundamental intuitions, like the 
distinction between a (material) picture and an (immaterial) image or even the 
fundamental intuition of the pictorial turn that images mediate in a different way the 
shared external reality. As it has been shown, this communicative basis of the 
pictorial turn has been thoroughly described in the phenomenological analysis where 
the relationality between image-subject and image-object is intrinsic to the image-
consciousness. The fundamental reason why images communicate is the structure of 
the type of consciousness to which they pertain.  
 
The dematerialisation of the image has a methodological value in the 
phenomenological approach. This bracketing is meant to distinguish the phenomenal 
appearance as the primary layer in the formation of a visual significance that cannot 
be equated with the perception of an object in the flesh or with reading a text. In order 
to determine the specificity of a medium and its broader effects, its perception must 
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not be subordinated to similar media and their identifiable effects. If you identify a 
figure in a chart or in an image, a pertinent analysis has to evince what are the 
different effects of the figure in different contexts, as a figurative appearance or as a 
code. Hence, the advantage of the phenomenological approach is that it accounts for 
two issues: firstly, how the intuition of pictures essentially differs from other forms of 
intuition; secondly, that this difference justifies the significance of the visual because 
pictures do not just relate to other modes of representation but primarily constitute 
their own image-object that is autonomous from language. 
 
In this sense, the relation between image and text in the analysis of images is not that 
of emulating the two. What you see is not what you can also read according to a 
system of conventions. To the contrary, Imdahl’s iconic method starts from the idea 
of determining how the pure visual force of an image resists and modulates the 
textual reference. Visual signification does not consist in an image emulates a text but 
in an image that works through a text and inflects in it specifically visual tensions that 
are not present in the text. Establishing differences between the visual and the 
discursive is hardly an original intuition: distinctions have influenced various modern 
aesthetic systems.25 However, through the description of the image-object and of the 
‘visualising seeing’, the phenomenological method determined the potentiality of the 
visual to transform the presentation of the world through images. There is an 
iconographic content in Giotto’s frescos, yet there is also the slat and the density of 
the ciborium that resist the reduction of the image to the text. Hence, understanding 
this infinite potential of the visual provides a framework for the conception of the 
image as a field of forces with its own directions and tensions. It is in this sense that 
the phenomenological model is a significant contribution to the project of the picture 
theory.  
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Fig. 1: Giotto - The Presentation of Jesus in the Temple (1304-1306) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Giotto - Kiss of Judas (1304-1306) 
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   has	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   how	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   visual	   images	   depends	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   (as	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  2011,	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2  The continental tradition developed consistently the phenomenological and hermeneutical 
approach. A key figure here is Gottfried Boehm and his work on the ‘iconic difference’ as the ‘visual 
contrast’ between an emerging outline and a background. Boehm emphasises the priority of the visual 
as mode of signification in comparison to the discursive (since we exchange images before we talk) 
2  The continental tradition developed consistently the phenomenological and hermeneutical 
approach. A key figure here is Gottfried Boehm and his work on the ‘iconic difference’ as the ‘visual 
contrast’ between an emerging outline and a background. Boehm emphasises the priority of the visual 
as mode of signification in comparison to the discursive (since we exchange images before we talk) 
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and the synaesthetic effect of images as entities that confront the viewer with ‘the tension between the 
eye, the hand and the mouth’ (la tension entre l’oeil, la main et la bouche, in Alloa, ed., 2010, 39, my 
translation). See Boehm, Gottfried, Ce qui se montre. De la difference iconique in Alloa, ed., 2010, 27-
49 and Was ist ein Bild? (1995).  
3  See also Mitchell’s reading of Goodman from Iconology (1986), 50-67. Norman Bryson, in 
Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (1983), also defended a position similar to Goodman, 
namely that visual presentation conforms to a system of conventions. This emulation of the visual to 
the linguistic has a long tradition. In Art and Illusion (1960), Gombrich discussed the status of 
recognition and resemblance as a function of images. In the analytical tradition, Robert Hopkins and 
John Hyman are significant researchers in the line of Goodman. See, amongst other titles, Robert 
Hopkins’ Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical Inquiry (1998) and John Hyman’s Pictorial 
Art and Visual Experience (2000). Here too, visual experience is accounted for in terms of the 
identification of an image’s correlate based on a comparison to previous perceptive experiences. While 
clearly distinguishing the visual as a specific type of signification, the communicative function of 
images still prevails.  
4  These theories recuperate an argument that Roman Jakobson formulated in the 1920’s. In On 
Realism in Art (1921), Jakobson argued that just the viewer first acquires the language of painting just 
like learning a language, i.e. the conventions according to which the painting works. See Jakobson 
1987, 21. See also John Hyman’s critical discussion of Goodman in The Objective Eye: Colour, Form, 
and Reality in the Theory of Art (2006). 
5  See the pertinent analysis of Emmanuel Alloa, Changer du sens. Quelques effets du ‘tournant 
iconique’ (2010).  
6  Gottfried Boehm collected and edited Fiedler’s writings in Schriften zur Kunst, I, II (1991).  
The literature dedicated to Fiedler often refers to these two essays: Über den Ursprung der 
künstlerischen Tätigkeit (1887) and Über die Beurteilung von Werken der Bildenden Kunst (1876).  
Philippe Junod’s Transparance et opacité (1976) is still the most elaborate study on Fiedler. See also 
Danièle Cohn’s epilogue to the French translation of the Über Ursprung der künstlerischen Tätigkeit, 
published in 2008 (originally published in 2003).  
7  See Wiesing 1997, 163. 
8  Lambert Wiesing argues that Fiedler’s notion of ‘pure visuality’ has to be understood as a 
‘self-contained form of being’. (Wiesing 1997, 163) 
9  Ernst Cassirer and Nelson Goodman too, conceived art as a symbolic system adjacent to 
science and language. For Cassirer, art is a symbolic form that mediates the world by endowing it with 
a visual sense. In the myth there is a tension between the form and the content because, while the 
content is absorbed into the image, it also attempts to free itself from its sensuous aspect. 
Contrastingly, the artistic formation of the world liberates itself from the tensions of the myth. The 
viewer does not use the image to look to the religious figure through it but perceives it as an 
autonomous symbolic form. (Cassirer 2003, 94) For Goodman art, language and science are versions of 
the world that can only be verified within their own symbolic frame. In his Languages of Art (1968), 
like Fiedler, he argues that art shapes a world independent of resemblance with the exterior reality.  
10  In The Manifold of Perception (1972), Podro traces this metaphor back to Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Mind where it is used in the context of developing philosophical systems. The organic metaphors of 
growth are in fact common in the 19th century German philosophy, as in Goethe or Herder. In fact, 
Fiedler’s background is neo-Kantian because emphasises the formatting qualities of the mental 
faculties. Like von Humboldt, he sees the development of the mind as depending on the development 
of language. Art too, like the mind, develops from disorder to order, from the formless to the formed. 
On the problems involved in the analogy of visual arts and language, see Podro 1972, 114-120.  
11  Fiedler writes: ‘Creation of form must be imagined as a thought process in which the 
architectural forms themselves are the content.’ (in Mallgrave 1994, 130) 
12  Husserl’s phenomenology of the image is developed in Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, 
Erinnerung (1898-1925). There also references to the subject in Ideen and in Ding und Raum. Deeply 
indebted to Husserl, Sartre analysed the consciousness pertaining to images in L’imagination (1936), 
especially in the last chapter, dedicated to Husserl, and in L’imaginaire (1940). On Husserl’s image 
consciousness and the visual arts see Nicolas de Warren, Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s 
Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness (2010). 
13  The German Bild can refer both to the material carrier and to the immaterial appearance. 
Husserl’s distinction between image-object and image-subject clarifies this semantic ambivalence. 
Lambert Wiesing argues that this ‘derealisation’ of the image is a means of abstracting the pure 
visuality. See Wiesing 1997, 227. Nicolas de Warren also points out that this ‘indifference or suspicion 
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of the particular cultural context of the image’ has a methodological function meant to describe the way 
in which images are given to consciousness in distinction from objects present in the flesh. See de 
Warren 2010, 314.  
14  Husserl writes: 'The photograph image object (not the photographed object) truly does not 
exist. "Truly" - that does not signify: [not] existing outside my consciousness; on the contrary, it 
signifies not existing at all, not even in my consciousness. What does really exist is the determinate 
distribution of colours on the paper and likewise a corresponding complex of sensations that I 
experience in contemplating the photograph. In the same way, the phantasy image truly does not exist 
at all, but there does exist in the experience of the phantasy a complex of sensuous phantasy contents 
corresponding to the image.' (Husserl 2005, 119) [Das photographische Bildobjekt (nicht der 
photographierte Gegenstand) existiert wahrhaft nicht. Wahrhaft, das besagt nicht: außer meinem 
Bewußtsein, sondern überhaupt nicht, auch nicht in ihm. Was wirklich existiert, das ist die bestimmte 
Farbenverteilung auf dem Papier und desgleichen eine entsprechende Komplexion von Empfindungen, 
die ich, die Photographie betrachtend, erlebe. Ebenso existiert eine ihm entsprechende Komplexion 
von Sinnlichen Phantasieinhalten im Erlebnis der Phantasievorstellung. Husserl 1980, 110] 
15  See de Warren 2010, 326.  
16  In chapter 3, section 15-16, Husserl distinguishes between immanent and symbolic images. In 
the immanent imaging, the image-object has an internal relation to the image-subject, like a 
reproduction of a painting in a catalogue that has an internal and immanent relation to the original 
painting. In symbolic imagining, there is no internal relation between the image-object and the image-
subject. The visual appearance signals its referent, like in the case of hieroglyphs that are signs with no 
internal relation to that which they presentify (or render present).    
17  See Bredekamp’s Darwins Korallen. Die frühen Evolutionsdiagramme und die Transition der 
Naturgeschichte (2005).  
18  See Jonathan Crary’s Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth 
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19  On the history of vision in correlation to other senses see Martin Jay’s Downcast Eyes  (1994), 
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eds., 2012, 119-134. 
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23  Bildlichkeit can be rendered as ‘visuality’ even though there is no English word that can 
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24  Also, the image differentiates between two groups. On the one hand, there is the main scene 
consisting of the relation between Mary, Jesus and Simeon. On the other hand, there are scenic distinct 
moments, like the relation between the angel and Simeon and the relation between the gestures of 
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